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BOOK REVIEWS
LEON GREEN, The Judicial Process in Tort Cases (Second Edition),
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota (1939) pp. i-xxi,
1-1356, $.........
Dean Green is so well known that it is almost trite to make a
statement of what he stands for in the field of tort ideology. The
second edition reveals considerable development in all directions,
the best statement being that Green's objectives are not only to
master tort law but the whole judicial process, mature the student's
power of judgment, extend one's grasp of government, and make
legal training a much more rounded-out and adequate process. Only
a Leon Green would have the ambition, much less the capacity to
attempt such a multifarious project.
Green has probably done more than any other one man to establish factual categories in terms of tort doctrinal formulae. No longer
will his three-fold classification of interests and harms come as a
shock to the traditionally trained English student of law ruled by
the old forms of action. Green, undoubtedly, is not regarded so
much today as being revolutionary as one insisting upon clearer insights into the personal, property, and relationship interests, the
physical, appropriational, and defamatory harms; the judge, jury,
theories, doctrines, formulae, rules, etc., involved in the judicial
process, and the various types of protections afforded, i. e., compensation, prevention, punishment, and insurance. His fundamental
postulates denote a deeper judicial psychology than the individual
judicial opinions grounded in the legal thinking of Cooley and English authorities. If any one man has ever thrown "proximate cause,"
Green ought to get the credit. Tort law is all the more accurate and
predictable because of his analysis. His critical evaluation of the
untrained reasoning of courts in the last century is accomplished by
reducing the Smith-Bohlen-Beale-Bingham conception of legal cause
to its lowest terms by means of functional standards. As Mr. Thurman Arnold has said so well, "Dean Green pierces the layers of legal
'
dialectic which submerge the American trial court."
If the reviewer were to take issue with Green's dictum that
general propositions are not concrete cases, it would be that the
general propositions are the reason for concrete cases. When Green
says that it is the variety of legal rules which save us, to the reviewer
what is meant is that the strength of legal rules lies in their relationships. A factual classification is nothing more than the grooves
that throw into relief legal doctrine. The question is which is which?
Abstractly considered, process as a fact is doctrinal theory and vice
'40 Yale Law Journal 833 (March 1931).
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versa. Otherwise, factual classifications and doctrines could not
exist. One is the leg of the other.
Green's next step properly would be to develop the social and
economic implications of the tort processes, for no one stands so well
qualified as he in isolating policy considerations involved. However,
the law would lose the benefit of a legally trained mind, and it is
too much to expect of any one person equal facility as a legalist and
a social scientist.
ORBA F. TRAYLOR,
Research Director
Kentucky Legislative Council.
WImLIAm L. PROSSER, Handbook of the Law of Torts, Hornbook
Series, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota (1941) pp.
i-xiii, 1-1309, $.........
Tort liability is reduced to three primary categories, i. e., (1)
Intentional interferences, (2) Negligence, and (3) Strict liability.
By so doing, a delightful contrast is given to the preliminary groping which the beginning law student meets in attempting to master
a casebook such as Dean Green's The Judicial Process in Tort Cases.
It is significant that despite Prosser's tripartite development of legal
theory, he is in every chapter so much under the influence of Dean
Green. There is a well-balanced mixture of general principles and
cases, the result of which is to give enough vision to govern the general subject and yet enough precision to avoid the charge of a too
great generality. The conflicts of the majority and minority views
are pointed out and who currently among the authorities take certain
positions. Prosser is not adverse to giving his conception of what
the law on a particular subject is in view of the authorities rather
than giving a bald statement of the rules and legal doctrines involved.
On certain aspects of tort liability, Prosser shows how such
material can be handled better in hornbook style than by case presentation, i. e., employers' liability, domestic relations, etc. However, his definition of nuisance as a type of interest invaded and
negligence as conduct necessitates some reclassification which may
be more troublesome than useful. In the field of misrepresentation,
Perry v. Peek may preclude his wish that all misrepresentations could
be straight-jacketed into the three-fold classification of intentional
interferences, negligence and strict liability. In the chapter on the
misuse of legal procedure, the tripartite theory is put to it to distinguish clearly intentional interferences, negligence and strict
liability.
One could raise without limit many questions of proper classifiscation, but the fact is that this is an unusually well developed
Hornbook, which points out the difficulties and confusion that exist
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ini the field of torts. In short, here is plain, straightforward attempt
to untangle the entire field of tort law.
ORBA F. TRAYLOR

Research Director
Kentucky Legislative Council
Paying for Defense. By ALBERT GAIORDn HART and EDWARD D.
ALLEN and others. 1941. pp. viii-275. The Blakiston Company,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Unlike most symposiums, this thin volume has unity, coherence,
and emphasis. The result is attained largely, it appears, by having
Professors Hart and Allen take the original manuscripts (with three
or four exceptions) and revise them until they were fitted into a
unified plan.
The thesis of the volume rests on three assumptions: (a) Inflation is about the most objectionable national policy possible; (b)
although fiscal policy is not a cure-all for inflation, it is an indispensable instrument; and (c) despite the need of gearing financial policy
to control the price level, it is necessary to emphasize fair distribution
of tax obligations among members of the community. On the basis
of these views (now more and more admitted by students of
defense economics), the authors reach certain definite policies for
the American government. (1) Taxes should be imposed promptly
and vigorously. The core of revenue policy should be personal
income taxation to be increased by cutting exemptions to (say) half
the 1940 level, by increasing rates, by devising and applying means
of current collection, and by working out a plan of rate flexibility.
(2) It may be desirable to employ forced loans in conjunction with
such a tax program. (3) Borrowing should be primarily from
individuals, certainly not from banks.
JAMES W.

MARTM

University of Kentucky
Military Law and Defense Legislation. By A. ARTHUR SCEILER.
St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co. 1941. pp. xxxiv, 647.
Professor Schiller adds a new subject to the already long list of
casebooks available for law school use. His is the first real attempt
to apply the case method to the teaching of military law. The subject does not lend itself readily to this method of treatment. Nearly
a third of the material has been drawn from the opinions of attorneys
general, judges advocate general, the selective draft acts, the Manual
for Courts Marshal, the Articles of War and from executive orders.
Since the problems dealt with are more federal than state, it is not
surprising to find the court opinions used decided by the federal district and circuit courts. It is consequently a question of taking
such opinions as can be found than one of selecting the decisions that
will provoke the most discussion in class. The compiler has also
been handicapped by the fact that in this branch of the law there are
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not as many conflicting court views as may be found in other fields
of the law.
The suddenness of the demand for a casebook in this field has
not given the author the opportunity to try out his materials as
thoroughly in the classroom as is the case generally. There are
evidences of haste in its preparation. Opinions that cover several
phases of the law, have been cut up and parts of the same case used
under different headings. The result is that we have more of a
text book treatment of the subject than by the case method.
The appearance of the book at this time makes it doubly welcome
to those teachers who have suddenly found themselves called upon
to give a course in this field. It gives them the materials to work
with which would otherwise require much time and patience to
collect.
University of Kentucky
W. LEwis ROBERTS
College of Law
Cases and Materials on the Law of Landlord and Tenant. By
ALBERT C. JACOBS. Second Edition. Property Series. St. Paul,
Minn. West Publishing Co. 1941. pp. xxix, 815.
Professor Jacobs' casebook covers a phase of property law that
receives much less attention in the average law school curriculum
than it deserves. Some very difficult problems grow out of the
relation of landlord and tenant and some goodly fees arise out of
their successful solution.
This casebook is one of the Columbia series covering the field of
property law. Vendor and Purchaser by Handler; Prossessory
Estates by Powell; and Trusts and Estates, also by Powell, make up
the complete set.
This second edition of Professor Jacobs' casebook contains some
recent cases and new material. There is also a shift in emphasis to
some of the more recent developments of the subject. The new book
is somewhat more compact than its predecessor-about a hundred
pages shorter.
The cases are well selected and edited. They make interesting
reading. A glance at the chapter headings will reveal a logical
arrangement: characteristics of leases, creation, covenants implied on
the part of the lessor, restrictions on the use of the property,
covenants regarding the lessee's use, interference with his interest,
transfers for lessor and lessee, devolution of covenants, rent, security
devises, taxes, repairs, construction, termination, breach of condition,
surrender, option to purchase, renewals and extensions, and holdovers.

This book contains many excerpts from leading text books, very
full notes, citations of cases and references to law review annotations
and articles.
The form and work of the publishers are all that can be desired.
University of Kentucky
W. LEwIs ROBERTS
College of Law

